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E.: Constitutional Law--Impairment of Contract--Retrospective Limitat
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
was held not to apply where defendant stopped his truck on and
temporarily blocked the highway to tow another's car out of a
ditch and plaintiff was injured in a collision with the truck. The
word "park" in such statutes is frequently interpreted as not referring to pmergency stops or those made for similar purposes.8
A fortiori this meaning seems proper where the stationary vehicle
is a wrecking truck maintained for that express purpose.9 In any
event decedent in the instant case was probably not a member of
the class which the legislation- was designed to protect, being neither
motorist nor pedestrian but only an onlooker.10
However it should be observed that exemption of disabled
vehicles and those rendering assistance thereto from the application
of the statutes does not release such vehicles from the basic requirement of reasonable care."
D. D. J., JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT -

RET-

ROSPECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON CLAIMS UNDER OPTIONAL COMPENSATION SYSTEm. - A 1939 amendment to the Code" provided that
no further award should be allowed on claims for workmen's compensation resulting from injuries incurred prior to March 2, 1929,
unless written application for redetermination were made before
September 15, 1939.' The amendment took effect March 11, 1939,
thus leaving six months to apply for redetermination. Claimant,
injured in 1919 when there was no time limitation on redetermination of awards,' received an award, which was modified twice, and
which expired June 21, 1923; he filed application for redetermination August 2, 1940. Held, that the amendment, in depriving the
8 Leveillee

v. Wright, 300 Mass. 382, 15 N. E. (2d) 247 (1938).

9 Bowmaster v. DePree Co., 258 Mich. 538, 242 N. W. 744 (1932)

Shearer

v. Puent, 166 Minn. 425, 208 N. W. 182 (1926); Duke v. Mitchell, 153 Miss.
880, 122 So. 189 (1929).
ioSprayberry v. Snow, 59 Ga. App. 744, 1 S.E. (2d) 756 (1939).
"i Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 186 S. . 167, 195 S. E.
247 (1938); Body, Fender & Brake Corp. v. Matter, 172 Va. 26, 200 S. E. 589
(1939) ; Kastler v. Tures, 191 Wis. 120, 210 N. W. 415 (1926) ; 42 0. J. 1007,
1009, 1012.

1W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 23, art. 4, § 16.
'1... no further award may be made in either fatal or non-fatal cases
arising on account of injuries occurring prior to March seventh, one thousand
nine hundred twenty-nine, unless written application for such award, signed
personally by claimant, or, in case of claimant's infancy or physical or mental
incapacity, by his or her guardian, next friend, or committee, be filed with the

commissioner on or before September fifteenth, one thousand nine hundred
thirty-nine." W. Va Acts 1939, c. 137, art. 4, § 16.

sW. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 15P, § 40.
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compensation commissioner of jurisdiction to reconsider the case.
did not impair the obligation of a contract under the contract
clause of the Federal Constitution.4 Greer v. Workmen's (ompensation Co n'r.5
The general principles respecting constitutionality of statutes
of limitations under the contracts clause of the Constitution are
well settled. Statutes creating, extending, or shortening a time
limitation are upheld as constitutional under the contracts clause
when applied to prior contracts, if they leave a reasonable time in
which to bring action and do not take away or unreasonably enWhat constitutes a reasonable time is a
cumber all remedies.'
legislative and not a judicial question, unless the time allowed by
the new statute is so short as to render assertion of claims practical1
y impossible.7 In upholding the constitutionality of statutes of
limitations, the courts justify their decisions on the ground that
such statutes affect only the remedy, not a substantive right under
the contract. 8
The West Virginia workmen's compensation law being voluntary, a contract exists between the employer and employee who accept the law.9 The contract is embodied in the compensation law
existing at the time the employment is entered into, and becomes a
part of the employment contract. 10 Claimant contended that, since
the law existing at the time of the injury contained no time
limitation on applications for redetermination, a later limitation on
such applications would impair his rights under the contract, and
would thus be unconstitutional. This argument raises a question
as to the effect of a statute of limitations on a workmen's compensation contract, entered into at a time when no limitation was
placed on claims arising from such contracts. While authority on
the subject is meagre, a Washington case involving similar facts
§ 10.
r15 S. E. (2d) 175 (W. Va. 1941).
4 U. S. CoNsT. Art. I,

' Union County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Weltchek, 12 N. J. Misc. 847, 175
Atl. 625 (1934). Accord: Smith & Marsh v. Northern Neck Mut. Fire Ass'n,
112 Va. 192, 70 S. E. 482 (1916) ; 116 C. J. S. 846.
7 Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55, 22 S. Ct. 573, 46 L. Ed. 804 (1902);
Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. Ed. 365 (1877); 12 Am. Jur. 89, 90.
a Dobson v. Wilson & Co., 152 Kan. 820, 107 P. (2d) 676 (1940); State
Land Board v. Lee, 84 Ore. 431, 165 Pac. 372 (1917); 1 WooD, L-=rATiONS
(4th ed. 1916) 45, 46.
9 Accord: Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862, L. R. A. 1916D 637
(1916); Patton v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 36 S. W. (2d) 1000 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1931).
20 Walsh v. Waldron, 112 Conn. 579, 153 Atl. 298, 78 A. L. R. 1301 (1931);
Thomas v. Parker Rust Proof Co., 284 Mich. 260, 279 N. W. 504 (1938); 1
SOHNEmER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATioN LAw (2d ed. 1932) 87, 88.
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adds support to the decision of this case. A statute imposing a
three year limitation on applications for readjustment of a compensation award was held constitutional when applied to deny a claim
which had vested before this amendment was passed,"' and the
decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.' 0 The
case, while distinguishable from the instant case, since the Washington statute was compulsory, 13 not contractual, is similar in that
when the right to compensation had vested, at the time of the injury, there was no time limitation on applications for redetermination. In both cases, the contention that the claimant had a vested
right in the provisions of the statute providing no time limitation
on applications for redetermination of awards was denied.
Most cases dealing with statutes of limitation on compensation
claims have had to do with modifications of existing limitations. In
these cases, courts have upheld the constitutionality of amendments
extending, 4 reducing,'" and completely withdrawing l the limitation.
It is submitted that claimant's contention that the statute was unconstitutional, because at the time of the injury the statute provided for unlimited redetermination of awards, is inconsistent with
the holdings of these cases. It is difficult to see why one claimant's
right to a twelve months' limitation is not just as strong as another's right to a claim on which there is no limitation at all, and,
if it is not unconstitutional to reduce the limitation from twelve
months to six months, it would seem that it should not be unconstitutional to impose a six months' limitation on claims previously
unlimited.
E. I.E.
"3Mattson v. Dep't of Labor & Industries, 176 Wash. 345, 29 P. (2d) 675

(1934).

3. Mattson v. Dep't of Labor & Industries, 293 U. S. 151, 55 S. Ct. 14, 79
L. Ed. 251 (1934).
13 WASH. REv. STATS. (Remington, 1933) §§ 7673, 7674.
14 Dobson v. Wilson, 152 Kan. 820, 107 P. (2d) 676 (1940) ; Ferguson Co.
v. Seaman, 119 N. J. L. 575, 197 Atl. 245 (1938); Streng's Piece Dye Works
v. Galasso, 118 N. J. L. 257, 191 Atl. 874 (1937).
35 Duquoin Tp. High School District v. Industrial Comm., 329 Ill. 543, 161
N. E. 108 (1928); Chicago v. ndustrial Comm., 292 Ill. 409, 127 N. E. 46

(1920).

le Smolen v. Industrial Comm., 324 Ill. 32, 154 N. E. 441 (1926).
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